Undoubtely, our daily lives have drastically changed over the years, shifting from a traditional to a more electronic way of living and communicating. This is the main reason that cyber-crook "profession" is booming and authorities or agencies have found themselves in a difficult situation while trying to deal with this rapidly spreading plague. As a consequence, new words, like cyber-war, cyber-espionage and cyber-crime, have emerged. Within this context, 2011, has been both the year of cyber-security awareness, as countless cyber-attacks found their way to the news headlines and the year with most intrusions ever aimed at companies and government agencies.
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boost up their market share, along with their profits. It is undoubtedly safe to say, that cyber-crime is damaging this effort. Within this volatile as well as intriguing corporate environment, securing the Information Systems (IS) that a corporation has is more crucial than ever. However, security cannot be managed if it cannot be measured [9] . Thus, a new problem arises that, of measuring the security level of an IS.
Another critical factor that points to the same direction is that, corporations try to handle their security risk exposure, by adopting various standards or best practices, and/or by implementing a series of counter measures for mitigating their risk. However, for an effective and efficient design of any counter measure, one has to know what the corporation's residual risk is, which is the amount of risk that it undertakes. Perhaps, this is one of the most difficult problems that risk managers are facing nowadays, as business environment complexity has grown exponentially over the past years. Regarding the Information Technology (IT) environment, this is translated to the usage of sophisticated ISs that work together within the corporation, providing the desired support of its business in a 24x7 basis. Hence, the problem remains the same: How a risk manager or any other manager can make an educated decision about the security level of the corporation's ISs? Moreover, if the security level of the corporation's ISs is unknown, how can one design effective and efficient security counter measures?
To this end, our work presents a new methodology for quantifying the security level of the corporation's IS or any other software product. In our methodology we propose the use of stochastic calculus, which can handle the time factor along with random phenomena of known distributions. Our approach is not as theoretical as it may appear, but rather practical as it employs the use of virtually all disclosed vulnerabilities, for well-known software vendors and their products. Moreover, it enables us to provide an unbiased, reliable and solid number that depicts the security level of an IS, utilizing mathematical methodologies, that are already used in Finance.
BACKGROUND WORK
Studies in the area of security assessment adopt methodologies of analysis that are basically of two kinds: Vulnerabilityspecific and vulnerability category-specific. The proposed methodology, based on the definition of the technical risk factor, is neither of the first nor of the second kind and is aimed to provide unbiased and objective results, that can be applied to a more corporate profile. The degree of applicability of such a methodology is achieved more efficiently using a more general aspect of vulnerability categorization rather than using the existing vulnerability taxonomies.
In [1] a characteristic vulnerability-specific analysis is given, which tries to connect each vulnerability category to a security level so that risk analysis will be focused on vulnerabilities with higher risk. The authors perform a statistical analysis of the accumulative vulnerabilities of several major operating systems in order to identify repeatable patterns in the datasets and model vulnerability growth. In this work the focus is on the size of the vulnerabilities population and the growth trends. We believe that analysis of the accumulative vulnerabilities, that an Operating System (OS) historically exhibited, should focus on time distribution patterns using specific time periods i.e. certain weekdays or certain months of a year. We illustrate that such patterns have more significance in security quantification than the absolute amount of vulnerabilities through time on which this analysis is focused.
Peotta and Gondim [11] pose the problem caused by the extensive reliance on subjective, qualitative inputs for security assessment. The major goal of our research is to solve this crucial problem and achieve objectivity at satisfactory levels. In this work the authors suggest the use of historical data and the application of proper analytical techniques to identify security risk trends and correlations. They also recommend the focus to be on software components and applications rather on specific vulnerabilities or vulnerability categories. In our research we suggest that the focus should be on the same level of security risk factors, and we propose the use of a more formalistic method for security measurement, verified by historical data.
In [12] the author tries to provide evidence of how effective security solutions were in reducing risks, as well as what kind of reduction in the risk level we expect from security solutions in general. So, he introduces a security metrics taxonomy for Information Communication Technology (ICT) products, based on his extensive research of the worldwide bibliography. His proposed model of taxonomy is a high-level information security metrics taxonomy, that incorporates metrics for both organizational information security management and product development. He argues that security is a topic that involves all the employees of an organization. Therefore, one should take advantage of the experience gained from the others and not try to "re-invent the wheel", as he states. Although his taxonomy produces a coherent snapshot of an organization, it does not provide with the tools to come up with a solid number for measuring security level for a product or service.
In [5] a metric called "attack surface" is defined, which can be used by both the industry and the consumers. They authors envisioned that software developers, as well as consumers, could use this tool to periodically measure the attack surface of their system and compare it with their previous measurements. This comparison could give the desired security level measurement of their system. Their definition of the attack surface is "the set of ways in which an adversary can attack the system". In order to measure the attack surface they have introduced two notions; the damage potential and the effort. As the damage potential -of a system resource being attacked-gets higher, the higher the attack surface of that system becomes. On the other hand, the higher the effort, that a potential attacker needs in order to gain access to the system and produce damage, the lower the system's attack surface is. It is indeed a way to produce a metric for security level quantification, but we believe that the "effort" notion is not objective, so the metric will be biased.
The I3P in [3] , follows a more practical approach, it proposes a multi-factor scoring system for better accommodation of the decision making process through the management levels of the company. The author argues that if a company addresses the risks that stem from IT security issues, it provides a solution for them as well. Therefore, it is rather a managerial problem than a technical one. The proposed scoring system includes scoring methods that exists in risk-based markets, such as, credit scoring, bond rating, cyber vulnerability scoring, cyber insurance questionnaires, the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI), and ISO cyber security standards and benchmarks. It cannot be argued that incorporating risk addressing methods, industry standards and frameworks, as well as best practices really helps in building a more secure IS environment. However, it does not provide us with an unbiased method for quantifying the security level of a system.
As mentioned earlier, a metric implies a system of measurement. In [4] the authors researched further on the characteristics of a metric for a measurement system and the categories that a metric falls into. According to them, a good metric should be specific, measurable, achievable, repeatable -that is being able to be reproduced by a third party-and time-dependent. They argue that any metric falls into one of four big categories which are, Risk Management Metrics, Budget Management Metrics, Audit and Compliance Assessment Metrics and finally Security Operations Metrics. Their approach is with no doubt needed in order to clarify metrics and measurements but it aims to categorize the metrics found -or to be found-and not to produce a method for assessing the security level of an IS.
In [2] a quantitative risk assessment methodology, named "(QuERIES)", is proposed, based on the combination of computer science theory, economic theory, game theory and control theory. For quantifying the results, they use finite Markov chains. Finally, they use the Information -or decision-Markets Theory, from the area of economics, in order to project their findings to the future and produce an estimation of the probability and costs of successful attacks, against proposed and deployed security technologies. The theoretical background used, is by no means in dispute, and is based on large amounts of historical data in the industries of finance and insurance. However, they state that due to "the absence of a theoretical framework and actuarial-class data about information assurance", the data used for the proposed model, came from simulation of attack models and therefore are subjective and biased.
METHODOLOGY
In order to quantify the security our approach uses stochastic calculus. As stock prices daily change affecting the valuation of the portfolios that comprise it, we similarly regard an IS a set of components which have every day a different value. By aggregating these values, we have the security level of our system. In the case of stocks many models use stochastic calculus in order to forecast the upcoming values and we adopt the same tools to approximate the security level of an IS in certain periods of time. The approach that we make is vulnerability driven, meaning that we take into consideration already disclosed vulnerabilities to quantify current security level.
We assume that, the disclosure of vulnerabilities and patches are fluctuations of random Brown movements, which are made on top of known deterministic movements of the security status of the components of an information system. Therefore, we will regard that these fluctuations can be modeled by Itō processes.
We assume that our IS I consists of n + 1 components, which can be anything from hardware to software and at time t the security status of each component of I is determined by the vectors S(t, ω) = (S0(t, ω), S1(t, ω), ..., Sn(t, ω)) Vector S(t, ω) is a set of stochastic processes parametrized by time variable t ∈ R + , t ∈ [0, α]. Each Itō process is of the form
We should note that in this way we define more than one Brown movement in the equations, modeling more than one independent random sources. Let's see the advantage of this approach. Let c1 and c2 be the security level of two services S1 and S2 running on a web server and a vulnerability is found for this particular web server of our IS B1. Then the Brown movement B1 may decrease the security status c2 of S2 more than c1. On the other hand a security vulnerability B2 on our web server might decrease more c1than c2.
Each θi(t, ω) corresponds to the security status of each installed component i at time t.
The property of having each installation as an adaptive process, makes the administrator decide what components to use or not at time t, based solely on the information that he has up to that point and not letting the model have time gaps by looking into the future. Definition 2. The security level SL of an installation θ(t, ω) at time t is given by
The security level SL is thus a stochastic process itself which is adapted to Ft.
As already proposed in [10] , in order to calculate the security level, each component i is assigned with a "weight" ci, which is governed by the time factor and the amount of time that each component is being used. The model takes into account the total security, therefore it considers the fact that a component is not working in a 24 × 7 basis, so if there is a vulnerability on it, the system is only partially exposed. Moreover, the model takes into consideration the severity of the vulnerabilities of a component over time. This means that if there are no recent known vulnerabilities, the weight is decreased, while in the other case it increases. The same happens for the severity as well. In any case, in order to create a model that allows comparison between components, we used weighted entropy. Therefore, if we set: pi = number vulnerabilities of impact i total number vulnerabilities the weights are calculated by the following formula:
where:
• n is equal to the number of different impacts we have
• wj is the weight attributed to each vulnerability impact.
• m is the number of years that product i is in the market and p ijk is the probability that product i has a vulnerability of severity class j and it was k years ago.
• t ik represents the percentage use of component i, k years ago.
Hence, from all the above factors, only wj can be considered biased, so we use the according CVSS [6] , which is a highly regarded metric for vulnerabilities. This formulates our security level with respect to time and the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities as:
Let's suppose that we have an IS and we want to measure its security level. Firstly we divide it in separate and discrete software components. For each component, we gather the disclosed vulnerabilities and we arrange them on time frames so as to recognize possible patterns. Using these patterns, we may compute the function θi for each component. The next step is to compute the appropriate weight ci, for each θi. After that, we take the product of all these functions, which is a stochastic process of one variable, namely time t.
In order to calculate the θ functions, we sum the CVSS scores of each disclosed vulnerability and we projected them in the time period we want. Subsequently, we divide the daily CVSS sums with the total CVSS sum of each component. The resulting values range from 0 to 1 and sum up to one. For each product we exponentiate the respective values to the appropriate weight 1/ci. Since these values show how vulnerable the system is, we have to transform them, to show how secure it is, hence we subtract each of the them from number one, which denotes the totally secure system. Finally, if we want to end up to one function to perform the integration, then for each day, we compute the product of these values. Since we only have values at some distinct Figure 1 : The security level of two ISs, as calculated by SQT [7] .
points, we may use Fourier fitting, splines or other curve fitting methods to obtain a continuous function, that returns us the security level of our IS.
To fascilitate the calculations and provide some practical examples, we have developed a tool, SQT [7] , which uses XML exports from the National Vulnerability Database [8] , to quantify the security of an IS. Two examples for two different IS configurations can be seen in Figure 1 . The tool is released as Open Source, exporting graphs that illustrate the security level of a given IS and the changes over given time periods. In this implementation, each software component is considered to be working 100% of the time, Fourier curve fitting is being used, while NVD feeds provide the necessary vulnerability database.
CONCLUSIONS
The increasing reliance of organizations upon their ISs reveals IT risks which need to be effectively managed. For a successful mitigation of such risks, appropriate counter measures must be deployed. Moreover, in order to design effective and efficient counter measures, the security level quantification of the organizations' ISs is needed. In this work a new vulnerability-driven methodology is presented that utilizes stochastic calculus so as to provide us with a solid and unbiased number depicting the security level of any IS being analyzed. To this end, we have designed and implemented a new tool (SQT) that was used to perform the calculations needed. Two real life scenarios of ISs were presented and their security level was calculated. It is our belief that the adoption of the proposed methodology can greatly benefit any organization in evaluating the security level of its ISs.
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